THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILIZATIONS AGAINST RESOURCE EXTRACTION*

Moises Arce†

The extraction of natural resources in Peru has led to an impressive economic expansion, but the country has also had more than its share of protests against resource extraction. The conventional wisdom on mobilizations against extraction emphasizes their geographical dispersion throughout the country, the presence of weak protest movement organizations, and, ultimately, their minimal influence on national outcomes. Drawing on data from fieldwork and interviews, I identify the types of mobilizations that are more likely to lead to organized and sustained challenges against resource extraction. Following contributions on the political consequences of movements, I explain the conditions associated with positive movement outcomes as well as the types of collective goods produced by these mobilizations. Insofar as the extraction of natural resources is pivotal to a country’s political economy, the political consequences of protests over extraction in Peru have important ramifications for similar resource-based growth policies elsewhere in the developing world.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 337 people died as a consequence of violence in Peru, of which 228 were civilians and 104 were police officers (Caballero Martín 2011). These deaths, however, were not all related to the country’s long history of Maoist insurgency, as one might imagine. Instead, almost half of those deaths were related to protests, particularly protests over the extraction of natural resources.¹ These protests draw attention to the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment, as well as to distributional struggles over mineral wealth, and they are the most common type of mobilization in Peru today (Defensoría del Pueblo 2012). In addition, given the significance of resource-based growth policies for the national economy, these protests “are [also] among the most serious problems that confront” the country.²

Several studies on the recent surge of protests in Peru emphasize two broad characteristics of contentious episodes: their geographical segmentation or dispersion throughout the country, and the presence of weak organizations supporting protest activity. Generally, these mobilizations did not result in a process known as “scale-shift” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), in which isolated instances of protest transform into growing streams of mobilization, including the types of national-level protest movements that have emerged in neighboring and ethnically similar Andean countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. These characteristics suggest that these protests may have had a minimal influence on national outcomes. However, a comparative analysis of protests over resource extraction suggests otherwise. As shown in this article, these mobilizations not only led to immediate positive outcomes against local mining activities, but also contributed to positive national-level outcomes for larger groups. This finding forces us to ask: under what conditions are protest movements, which initially appear to be localized, segmented outbursts, likely to produce substantive gains for participants and nonparticipants of the movements?³

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* I would like to thank Edwin Amenta, Rose Spalding, Maria Victoria Murillo, and editors and Mobilization’s reviewers for their constructive feedback and helpful comments. I also thank Marc Polizzi for his work as research assistant on this project.
† Moises Arce is the Frederick A. Middlebush Professor in Political Science at the University of Missouri. Please direct correspondence to arcem@missouri.edu.

DOI 10.17813/1086-671X-21-4-469
Building on research that emphasizes the interactive and contingent effects of social movements, political opportunity structures, and other contextual factors (e.g., Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006; Cress and Snow 2000), and in particular what Marco Giugni (2004, 2007) calls a “joint-effect” political mediation model, I argue that the impact of protest on policy is greater when broad coalitions (or political alliances) intervene simultaneously with movement mobilization.4 Giugni (2007) also suggests that social movements addressing issues and policy domains with a low degree of saliency have a greater influence on policy. In his study, the ecological movement has the highest chance of shaping public policy because in the developed world, this movement is largely a “consensus movement” (Giugni 2007: 57). Departing from Giugni (2007), however, I argue that in the developing world, pressures for development often outbid environmental concerns (following the maxim “grow first, clean up later”), and citizens who live near extractive areas face that daunting challenge of reversing or blocking mining concessions. Thus, it is not necessarily easy for newly formed ecological movements to produce policy changes. In addition, rather than focusing on the viability of claims from the perspective of targets (e.g., the autonomy of political authorities and their margin for action), as in Giugni (2007), I emphasize the intractability of claims from the perspective of challengers and how their claims encourage both sustained collective resistance and the intervention of what Luders (2010) calls “third parties” who are pulled into these conflicts.

To grasp the political influence of protest movements, it is important to differentiate between the different types of mobilizations surrounding resource extraction. Accordingly, I propose a basic twofold typology: rights- and service-oriented mobilizations. Rights-oriented protests seek to defend basic rights, such as water access and quality, the integrity of land and landscapes, and/or cultural survival of indigenous or other minorities. Rights-oriented protesters frame their claims in terms of environmental risks and damages, and their collective resistance aims to block the granting of permits for new extractive sites or to halt the expansion of existing extractive activities. Service-oriented mobilizations, in contrast, seek a more equitable distribution of the revenues, royalties, or other economic benefits generated from resource extraction. Protestors do not seek to stop the advancement of the mining industry, but instead seek financial benefits, jobs, or funds to support community development or land reclamation.5

I argue that rights-based mobilizations are more likely to yield substantive gains for participants and nonparticipants of protest movements compared to service-based ones. Rights-based mobilizations entail broader claims that are more intransigent and less prone to compromise. These broader claims, in turn, create different kinds of community alliances and coalitions, producing organized and sustained challenges to resource extraction.6 The combination of broader claims with broader coalitions makes rights-oriented mobilizations more likely to yield collective goods or benefits for larger groups vis-à-vis service-oriented protests. Following contributions on the political consequences of movements (e.g., Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, and Su 2010), these collective goods can be seen at the structural level, as in the extension of consultation rights and practices and the formation by movements of new political parties, as well as at the intermediate level, as in legislative changes in government policies and the bureaucratic enforcement and implementation of these policies.

I begin this article by providing background information on the significance of resource extraction to developing economies like Peru and how resource extraction encourages protest activity. Thereafter, I explain the types of protests that are more likely to lead to organized and sustained challenges to resource extraction, as well as the political consequences of such protests. The article draws on a comparison of three subnational cases of mobilization against resource extraction. Since 2011, I have done fieldwork and conducted dozens of interviews in mining regions in northern and southern Peru since. The article concludes by revisiting the political consequences of protest movements against extraction.
PERU’S MINING BOOM

The extraction of natural resources in Peru, following the economic liberalization policies of the Fujimori era (1990-2000), has contributed to an impressive economic expansion, aided by record-high commodity prices and the growing Chinese demand for raw materials. Indeed, Peru’s economy has become one of the fastest growing and most stable in the Latin American region. In 2008, the economy grew by 9.8 percent. From July 2001 until March 2009, it accumulated 93 months of continuous expansion. This trend was briefly slowed down by the U.S. financial crisis of 2008–09, but the expansion resumed toward the end of 2009, remaining strong and resilient through 2013 (BCRP 2012). In 2013, the World Bank characterized the growth of the Peruvian economy as “Asian” because it mirrored the growth rates of East Asian economies.7

Similarly, the country’s GDP per capita more than doubled between 1990 (the start of the Fujimori era) and 2012 (from $4,459 to $9,421, based on international constant 2005 dollars). The percentage of the Peruvian population living in poverty declined from 58.7 percent in 2004 to 27.8 percent in 2011, and those living in extreme poverty dropped from 16.4 percent in 2004 to 6.3 percent in 2011 (BCRP 2012). A growing, consumer-oriented middle class has emerged from this economic expansion.

The extraction of natural resources, and mining specifically, has been the main driver of recent economic growth. In 2011, mining exports accounted for 59 percent of the country’s total exports. In the same year, mining represented over 15 percent of total taxes collected, 30 percent of all corporate income taxes paid and over 21 percent of all private investment. And since 1994, the share of the country’s GDP represented by resource extraction increased from 4.6 percent to 4.9 percent (Calfucura, Martinez Ortiz, Sanborn, and Dammert 2013). The effects of mining on the economy multiplied as a result of a commodity price boom. The price of gold, for instance, increased from $344 per troy ounce in the early 1990s to $1,225 in the first decade of 2000. In the same period, the price of silver rose from $4 per troy ounce to $20, and the price of copper increased from $1.03 per pound to $3.42 (MEM 2004, 2010).

The growing Chinese demand for raw materials also contributed to this bonanza. China has recently surpassed the United States as the main destination of Peru’s exports (these exports include copper, iron, zinc, and fishmeal) (BCRP 2012).

By the end of the first decade of 2000, Peru occupied a leading position in the global production of gold (as the fifth-largest producer), silver (first), copper, tin, and zinc (third for the latter three), and lead (fourth). In the same period across Latin America, Peru was first in the production of gold, lead, silver, tellurium, tin, and zinc, and second in the production of bismuth (after Mexico), copper, and molybdenum (after Chile for the latter two) (Gurmendi 2008). Peru also stands out as having the region’s highest concentration of the world’s top mining companies (Oxfam America 2009). Presently, at least twenty-one percent of the national territory (approximately twenty-six million hectares) is under some sort of mining concession (CooperAcción 2013). These concessions have led to clashes with local communities over the use of land and water in some cases, and the redistribution of mineral rents in others. Yet officials increasingly see mining as the mainspring of national development and as a key source of government revenue.

Resource extraction has a long history throughout the developing world.8 In Peru, for instance, the beginnings of large-scale mining can be traced to the operations of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC), an American mining company, at the turn of the twentieth century (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979). The origins of the country’s mining labor movement are also tied to CPC, as the company became the largest private employer in the nation (Pajuelo 2010). Yet the current wave of protests over natural resource extraction provides an ideal venue to understand the changing nature of mobilizations as a consequence of resource extraction or “new extractivism,” as others had called it.7 In particular, these mobilizations help us understand the geographic segmentation of protests as predetermined by the location of the mines themselves, as well as by the emergence of broad coalitions with diverse sets of new actors.
Under new extractivism, technological conditions have reduced the need for unskilled labor, and labor disputes between mining companies and workers have become less visible (Bebbington 2009). Instead, the so-called mega-extractive projects (megaproyectos mineros) have an increased need for water, energy, land, and landscape. New open-pit and heap-leaching techniques demand far greater access to each of these resources. These technological conditions imply that the actors involved in protests against the extraction of natural resources are largely the rural and urban populations affected by extraction. Additionally, their claims often include land, water quantity and quality, landscape, and the protection of the environment and their livelihoods. Seen in this light, new extractivism allows us to understand the new actors and types of coalitions that aggrieved groups have forged in opposition to extraction. These coalitions cut across classes, the urban and rural divide, and environmental and nationalist discourses.

However, not all of the mobilizations against new extractivism concern the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment. The commodity price boom alluded to earlier has yielded remarkable profits for extractive industries, and taxes collected from mining have become the most important intergovernmental transfer linked to the extraction of natural resources. In Peru, these transfers are known as canon minero (mining rents). These intergovernmental transfers have encouraged a sizeable number of mobilizations over their distribution and use across the different tiers of government: local, provincial, regional and national.

A TYPOLOGY OF PROTESTS OVER RESOURCE EXTRACTION

As several studies have documented, Peru experienced a surge in protests by a variety of social actors after the fall of the Fujimori regime in 2000 (Arce 2008, 2015). The country has the third-highest percentage of respondents reporting protest participation in the Latin American region (LAPOP 2012). The mobilizations against resource extraction are the most common type of protest in contemporary Peru (Defensoría del Pueblo 2012). Considering that mobilizations are both individually and organizationally costly, and protesters on the extractive frontier have varied motivations and pursue diverse goals, I propose a two-fold typology to differentiate the diversity of mobilizations surrounding resource extraction. This typology emphasizes the claims of aggrieved groups who are challenging resource extraction.

The “Bad News” of Resource Extraction: Rights-Oriented Mobilizations

The defense of basic rights, including the right to water, land, or cultural survival, is an example of rights-based mobilizations. Protesters often frame their claims in terms of environmental risks or damages, or what human and political ecologists have identified as vulnerability, or “the susceptibility to be harmed” (Adger 2006). The bulk of rights-based mobilizations simply oppose mining. In some cases, protesters concerned about the environment aim to prevent the mining activities from getting off the ground, as in the case of Tambogrande in the Piura region. In other cases, environmental activists seek to halt the expansion of already existing mining activities, as in Cerro Quilish in the Cajamarca region. In Piura, Canadian-based Manhattan Minerals Corporation (MMC) sought to construct an open-pit mine for the extraction of gold near the San Lorenzo Valley and Tambogrande. The project called for the relocation of thousands of residents and the rerouting of the tributaries of the Piura River. The mobilizations against MMC extended over a period of almost five years, starting in 1999 through 2003. In Cajamarca, U.S.-based Newmont’s Yanacocha mine became the largest gold producer in Latin America, and one of the largest foreign investment operations in Peru. The Yanacocha mine began to extract gold in the early 1990s. Several years later, buoyed by high prices, the company sought to expand its operations to other areas, such as Cerro Quilish in 2004 and Conga in 2012.
In other cases, local communities affected by extraction feel marginalized or excluded from the decision-making process regarding natural resource governance. These feelings of exclusion have also triggered a number of important protests demanding consultation rights on development projects that affect indigenous people. The 2008-09 mobilization in opposition to developing the Amazon in the province of Bagua is an example of protests over consultation rights. The U.S.-Peru free trade agreement signed in 2006 encouraged the expansion of the extractive frontier, and in the case of the Amazon region, the agreement sought to facilitate logging and the commercialization of indigenous communal lands. Mobilizations invoking consultation rights often incorporate an environmentalist discourse to further resist the exploitation of natural resources.

These mobilizations involve networks of actors in opposition to mining (e.g., local communities, local mayors, regional presidents, environmental NGOs), and opponents who support extractive activities (e.g., the mining industry, the central government, business associations and chambers of commerce, the national media). Local communities and authorities where extractive activities occur are quick to denounce the perceived collusion between mining companies and the central government in awarding mining claims, as well as the lack of environmental oversight surrounding extractive activities. Aggrieved communities point out the overt conflict of interest of the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), which on the one hand awards mining rights to extractive companies, and on the other hand assesses the environmental impact of mining projects on behalf of communities where mining takes place. As Bebbington, Connarty, Coxshall, O'Shaughnessy, and Williams (2007) describe, the success of the MEM rests on its ability to expand mining; thus it is highly unlikely that the ministry would seek to control anything.

The “Good News” of Resource Extraction: Service-Oriented Mobilizations

Distributional struggles centered on the division of tax revenues, royalties, or other economic benefits associated with mining exemplify service-based mobilizations. These mobilizations do not oppose mining activity, per se, nor do they seek mine closure as an ultimate goal. Protesters simply aim for financial improvement, job growth, or funds to support cleanup or other reclamation projects. In several cases, service-based mobilizations do not involve mining companies directly; rather, these mobilizations entangle local populations and political authorities representing the different tiers of government where the mineral resource is extracted. Local governments thus seek to integrate extractive activities already present with the development of the areas in which mining takes place.

In terms of the distribution of revenues, their allocation across different levels of government has changed over time. As several authors have suggested (Arellano-Yangus 2010; Avila, Viale, and Monge 2011), the perceived inequities in the distribution of revenues among presidents of regional governments, mayors of provincial municipalities, and mayors of district municipalities have triggered a sizeable number of protests. In terms of the use of revenues, the disputes pertain to the efficient management of resource windfalls, where efficient management refers to both its proper use and the capacity of local governments to deliver improvements where mineral extraction occurs. Local governments may choose to spend resource revenues on infrastructure projects or on improving service delivery. These investments may help to circumvent the negative externalities stemming from extractive activities (Collier 2010).11

Service-oriented mobilizations thus acknowledge the “good news” of extraction and seek a more equitable distribution of the revenues generated from mining. Protestors do not seek to stop the advancement of the mining industry. Moreover, the claims of protesters are specific and negotiable. As such, the state and private corporations are more likely to negotiate with activists, as these mobilizations do not directly threaten the existence of extractive activities. In contrast, rights-oriented mobilizations follow the “bad news” of extraction and seek to protect the water supply and lands from the perceived threats that are associated with
These all-or-nothing mobilizations seek to halt extraction and, at the same time, to raise broader claims that are more intransigent and less prone to compromise. These broader claims encourage different kinds of community alliances and coalitions. As the subnational comparison below shows, only rights-oriented mobilizations have led to organized and sustained challenges against extraction.

**SUBNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THREE CASES OF MOBILIZATION**

To the casual observer, protests in Peru during the first decade of the 2000s could be seen as sporadic, isolated events led by weak protest movements that could have affected a specific local situation but are ultimately ineffectual at increasing democratic responsiveness or pushing national policy. Echoing this observation, Cotler (2011) noted that Peru’s “social fragmentation conspires against the articulation of protest and their political purpose (p. 551)” which, in turn, allows national governments to “get their way” in most cases through negotiation and subscription of agreements with leaders of protest movements. In short, the conventional wisdom downplays the effects of territorialized mobilizations and emphasizes the presence of weak protest movements, or “mobilizations without movements” as Meléndez (2009) phrased it. We are forced, then, to ask the following: under what conditions are protest movements, which initially appear to be localized, segmented outbursts, likely to produce substantive gains for participants and nonparticipants of protest movements?

### Table. Comparison of Protest Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Action</th>
<th>Competition with Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Extraction deepens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sporadic mobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example: Cerro de Pasco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extraction stops and goes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustained mobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example: Bagua</td>
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One way to understand the outcomes of the hundreds of protests against resource extraction is by taking into account the relative economic importance of mining compared to other economic activities (particularly agriculture) as well as the relative strength of aggrieved groups compared to those in support of new extractivism (see table 1). In several regions of Peru, particularly in the central highlands, mining is not in competition with agriculture and, as a consequence, represents the only opportunity for making a living. The region of Pasco, situated at 4,380 meters (14,370 feet) above sea level, is a good example. As noted earlier, the beginnings of large-scale mining in Peru can be traced to this location, and despite the presence of important mobilizations then and now, resource extraction continues unaffected. The characteristics of the region of Pasco resemble the mining areas of Chile, where mining activities occur in the underpopulated north in and around the Atacama Desert (Calfucura et al. 2013).

In cases where mining competes with agriculture, as in Tambogrande and Cerro Quilish, the agricultural economy, by its very definition, makes available a range of preexisting organizations, such as producers’ associations (asociaciones de productores) and water users’ boards (junta de usuarios de riego), through which organized and sustained mobilizations can develop. These preexisting organizations are largely absent in areas where competition with agriculture is low, thus the likelihood of organized and sustained challenges against mining is also low. In areas with low competition with agriculture coupled with the absence of
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Preexisting organizations (e.g., Pasco), mining companies diffuse the demands of protestors by providing selective material rewards to the leaders of protest organizations (e.g., bribes or employment opportunities) or by spending money on high-profile projects in collaboration with local authorities, mostly municipal mayors (e.g., the beautification of the town’s central plaza or the rebuilding of the town’s school). The goal is to win the support of the local population and authorities through a series of small concessions. Mining companies also collude with the local media to harass and intimidate the leaders of protest movements, including the NGOs that oppose mining.

Thus, service-oriented mobilizations are likely to emerge in areas with low competition with agriculture and where there are no pre-existing agriculture-based organizations. These mobilizations generally, seek a better distribution and use of the town’s mineral wealth. The claims against mining are specific, sporadic, and likely to remain localized. These claims are also prone to compromise. As mentioned above, these mobilizations trace the good news of resource extraction and are not necessarily opposed to mining.

Conversely, the dynamics of protest movements are very different where mining competes with agriculture and where the agricultural economy enables a number of pre-existing organizations. In both Tambogrande and Cerro Quilish, agriculture-based organizations quickly coalesced into larger opposition movements known as defense fronts (frentes de defensa). In Tambogrande, the Defense Front of Tambogrande and the San Lorenzo Valley (also known as the Frente de Defensa del Valle de San Lorenzo y Tambogrande, FDVST) emerged as the leading antimining coalition against Manhattan Minerals Corporation (MMC). Similarly, the Defense Front of Cerro Quilish (Frente de Defensa del Cerro Quilish) appeared as the most important antimining coalition against Newmont Mining Corporation. Moreover, in several protests against new extractivism, the participation of Oxfam and other NGOs was crucial for the coordination of collective action among aggrieved communities affected by mining. These agriculture-based organizations as well as NGOs exemplify the different kinds of community alliances and coalitions behind organized and sustained challenges against extraction.

The relevance of these preexisting organizations (e.g., producers’ associations and water users’ boards) to successful challenges against extraction should not be underestimated. As an illustration, Muñoz Portugal (2009: 96) examines the role of the water users’ boards in other mobilizations in northern Peru, writing:

The majority of farmers who are members of these water users’ boards know each other from the past; they have approached each other multiple times for different reasons, sometimes because of business opportunities and other times because of family or communal activities; they see each other during the town’s celebrations or they have organized these festivities together; they go to the same restaurants or bars or shops to talk; and they also participate in the same parent-teacher conferences as members of these boards.

The presence of preexisting organizations with strong ties to the local community had two major consequences on the development of protest movements. First, they served as checks on leaders’ acceptance of material rewards and/or other forms of cooptation. Second, local leaders had a better grip on organizations and engaged in effective resistance, mixing what could be initially characterized as confrontational, disruptive strategies (e.g., destruction of property belonging to the mine) with assimilative and traditional types of grassroots democracy (e.g., referendum).

Yet the outcome of mobilizations where mining and agriculture are in competition with each other ultimately hinges on the relative strength of aggrieved groups vis-à-vis mining interests. Specifically, the strength of opposition groups is shaped by their associational power and their collective power. Associational power (or organizational capacity) refers to the ability of subordinate social groups to create new organizations or to recast existing ones (e.g., transforming an agriculture-based organization into a defense front). Collective power (or coalitional capacity) refers to the ability of subordinate social groups to forge coalitions across new or recast organizations (e.g., forming a coalition between a defense front and other
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organizations outside the region affected by extraction). Generally, low collective action implies weak associational power and weak collective power. High collective action leading to broader coalitions against mining implies the opposite (see table 1). Strategic framing was instrumental for aggrieved groups to build associational power, as well as collective power.

In Tambogrande, local leaders opposed to mining had strong ties to local organizations and established a network of support consisting of national and international NGOs that successfully connected the antimining mobilization to the country’s national identity. Tambogrande is lime-rich, and limes constitute a key ingredient in a number of traditional Peruvian dishes. Slogans from the opposition campaign sought to “Save the ceviche” (Salvemos el ceviche). Another slogan read, “There is no ceviche without limes” (Sin limón no hay ceviche). This campaign was successful in creating a link between the local grievances affecting Tambogrande and the country’s traditions, boosting national solidarity on behalf of Tambogrande. This strategic framing allowed opposition groups to build associational power and collective power.

In contrast, in the northern region of Cajamarca, the Yanacocha mine has been subject to sporadic protests due to environmental contamination, land use matters, water-rights disputes, and so on. However, the organizations opposed to mining are highly fragmented and generally have not developed a larger network of support outside the region itself. In several of these protests, aggrieved groups and the Yanacocha mine agreed to negotiate their differences by establishing a bargaining roundtable (mesa de diálogo) and then settled by signing a deed of commitment (acta de compromiso). Mining operations may be interrupted while negotiations take place, but they later resume once a settlement has been reached. For this reason, a stop-and-go pattern characterizes the extraction of gold in Cajamarca (see table 1).

However, the 2004 mobilization of Cerro Quilish, where thousands of protestors staged a two-week general strike and derailed the expansion of the Yanacocha mine, was an exception to this stop-and-go pattern. Unlike previous protests against Yanacocha, this mobilization crisscrossed the rural-urban divide, producing the largest demonstration in the history of Cajamarca. As in Tambogrande, the mobilization of Quilish shows evidence of associational power (water users’ boards, for instance, served as the ground floor in support of the Defense Front of Cerro Quilish). However, unlike Tambogrande, the mobilization of Cerro Quilish did not spread outside the region of Cajamarca itself (see also table 2). The collective power of protestors in Quilish was largely regional, as rural-based organizations forged coalitions with urban-based ones, and their collective power came about as a consequence of the threat that mining posed to the town’s water supply. The strategic framing campaign of the Defense Front of Cerro Quilish presented a stark choice summarized as “water yes, gold no” (agua sí, oro no), which helped to draw the support of other organizations throughout Cajamarca and produced high levels of collective action in opposition to mining. While the protest stopped the extraction of gold in this zone, Newmont’s Yanacocha search for this mineral has moved to other areas (e.g., Conga in 2012).

Finally, the 2008-09 Bagua mobilization against opening the Amazon up for development was not directly tied to agriculture, as in the previous cases of Tambogrande and Cerro Quilish. Rather, the mobilization had more to do with the potential for deforestation as a consequence of logging and the commercialization of indigenous communal lands. In this region, aggrieved groups were already organized in the Interethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Rainforest (Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana, AIDESEP), an ethnic indigenous federation that has existed for decades. AIDESEP is also part of a larger transnational network of organizations advocating indigenous rights—the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica, COICA). AIDESEP’s ability to call for an Amazon strike (paro Amazónico) simultaneously affecting several regions in the country speaks directly to their associational and collective powers, which were vastly underestimated (or perhaps unknown) by the central government of Garcia (2006-2011). The success of AIDESEP’s opposition campaign also hinged on the cultural identity of the peoples who have inhabited the Amazon for generations. Land and indigenous identity are strongly linked to each other, becoming the grounds for
AIDESEP’s effective framing of their opposition campaign. Resource extraction continues in the Amazon region but has been limited in scale as a result of AIDESEP’s actions.

The case of Bagua strengthens the subnational comparative analysis presented above because theoretically it shows the relevance of resource mobilization and strategic framing outside the agricultural economy, which was pivotal for the mobilizations of Tambogrande and Cerro Quilish (see table 2). Beyond resource mobilization and strategic framing campaigns, the political context, particularly in the post-Fujimori period, was more conducive to challenges over resource extraction. Democracy bounced back after the Fujimori decade, providing new outlets for political representation at the subnational level (known as regional governments). Relatedly, violence—whether it originated from the government against protestors or aggrieved groups against mining companies—was closely watched and recorded by an emerging livelier and freer press (Conaghan 2005). To date, Bagua remains the most violent protest against new extractivism. According to the Office of the Ombudsman, thirty-three people were killed on June 5, 2009, when the police and the military were deployed to crack down on demonstrators. The violence also left two hundred people injured (eighty-two with bullet injuries) and eighty-three arrested (Defensoría del Pueblo 2009).

Table 2. Summary of Subnational Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cerro de Pasco</th>
<th>Tambogrande</th>
<th>Cerro Quilish</th>
<th>Bagua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of protest</td>
<td>Service-oriented</td>
<td>Rights-oriented</td>
<td>Rights-oriented</td>
<td>Rights-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition with agriculture</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational power</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective power</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic framing</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective goods</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three cases represented in table 1 (e.g., Tambogrande, Cerro Quilish, and Bagua) are examples of rights-based mobilizations. These mobilizations are against resource extraction and are motivated by environmental concerns in defense of the water supply or the protection of lands. Unlike service-oriented mobilizations, protestors in these cases have larger claims against mining (e.g., they seek to protect an existing type of livelihood, which is perceived to be better than mining), and their demands are more intransigent and less prone to compromise. In the words of the late Godofredo García Baca, who was the president of the Association of Mango Producers and a local leader who opposed mining in the Tambogrande area, “there is nothing to negotiate here” (aquí no hay nada que negociar) (De Echave, Diez, Huber, Revesz, Ricard Lanata, and Tanaka 2009: 34). Likewise, at the height of the indigenous mobilization in Bagua, the president of AIDESEP, Alberto Pizango, stated, “We will die defending our land.” In Cerro Quilish, noting the incompatibility between mining and agriculture, Genaro López Celis, president of the rural patrol (ronda campesina) in the Cajamarca population center of Yanacanchilla, declared, “We are not opposed to mining, we are only telling [Newmont’s Yanacocha] to do it elsewhere, not in our sources of water” (quoted in Salas Rodriguez 2006: 101). The leaders of these opposition movements were also less easily bought off, given their organizations’ strong ties to the local community. Overall, given the broader claims of aggrieved groups and their strong motivation (and emotions) in resisting mining, rights-based mobilizations have led to different kinds of community alliances and coalitions, providing the foundation for organized and sustained challenges against new extractivism. The combination of broader claims with broader coalitions, in turn, has resulted in positive responses on behalf of the less powerful as well as the larger groups.
THE COLLECTIVE GOODS OF RIGHTS-ORIENTED MOBILIZATIONS

Of the hundreds of protests related to resource extraction around the world, only a small fraction of these movements are successful in stopping mining (Özkaynak, Rodríguez-Labajos, Aydin, Yanez, and Garibay 2015). The same trend rings true for the Peruvian case. Preventing a mining project from being implemented is quite difficult due to clear power imbalances between extractive companies and local communities. Following the typology of protests over resource extractions outlined above, successful campaigns against mineral extraction incorporate rights-based claims. These campaigns represent emblematic cases, generate a great deal of publicity from local and even international media outlets, and evoke calls for social justice in home and host countries.

Consistent with research on the political consequences of social movements, a level of organized and sustained resistance is a necessary condition for influence. Since rights-oriented mobilizations are more likely to represent organized and sustained challenges against extractivism compared to service-oriented protests, the rights-oriented mobilizations of Tambogrande, Cerro Quilish, and Bagua have led to changes in state policy (i.e., the reversal of extractive concessions) consistent with the demands from aggrieved groups. However, beyond the direct impact of these mobilizations on local extraction, these protests also produced other substantive gains on behalf of larger groups. These outcomes could be seen as collective goods or benefits from which other societal actors cannot be easily excluded (Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta et al. 2010).

At the structural or systemic level, these mobilizations led to the extension of consultation rights and practices and the formation of new political parties by movements. The mobilization in Bagua in the Amazon region, for instance, forced the national governments of García (2006-11) and Humala (2011-16) to recognize Convention 169 (C169) of the International Labor Organization (ILO). C169 advances consultation and participation rights on behalf of indigenous peoples on issues that affect them. Peru ratified this agreement as early as 1994, but it had never been enforced. In August of 2011, the government of Humala approved the “Law of Prior Consultation,” aligning national laws with ILO Convention 169 and requiring national and foreign companies to seek consultation on development projects in indigenous lands. As of this writing, the implementation of these consultation rights remains difficult, yet the extension of these rights benefiting indigenous groups in and outside Bagua is an important structural change that came about as a consequence of this mobilization.

Also in the region of Cajamarca, the environmental threats associated with mining sparked the creation of the first ecological organizations in the country, such as ECOVIDA (Asociación para la Defensa Ambiental de Cajamarca), and ADEA (Asociación de Defensa y Educación Ambiental). These organizations brought together local environmental activists to raise awareness of the environmental threats surrounding Yanacocha’s presence in the region. As one would expect, several leaders of environmental as well as protest movements have ventured into national politics. Examples include Catholic priest Marco Arana (founder of the NGO GRUFRIDES), José de Echave (founder of the NGO CooperAcción), and Carlos Monge (Latin American regional coordinator for the Revenue Watch Institute). They created an environmentalist political party known as Tierra y Libertad (Land and Freedom) for the national elections of 2012 and 2016. José de Echave was later appointed Deputy of the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) during the government of Humala. In 2016, Marco Arana won election to the Peruvian Congress for the period 2016-21. The increasing electoral activity of those who challenge extraction speaks to their political leverage, and their appointment to government positions illustrates well what Gamson (1990) characterized as inclusion.

At the intermediate level, these mobilizations led to legislative changes in government policies and the bureaucratic enforcement and implementation of these policies. For instance, in the region of Cajamarca, the mobilization of Cerro Quilish provided decision makers with information, which then helped to shape the decentralized allocation of intergovernmental
transfers—the *canon minero*—These transfers are the primary tax vehicles for redistributing the profits of extractive companies. In the first decade of 2000, the distribution of these transfers underwent additional changes to devolve greater revenues to the localities where extraction takes place. Mobilizations like Quilish affected the responsiveness of policy makers to support these changes in the allocation of revenues. For instance, in the final days of the regional strike in Cajamarca, when Minister of Energy and Mines Jaime Quijandría arrived in the city to terminate Yanacocha’s mining project, he gave a speech acknowledging that the government “is the guilty one” (*es el culpable*) for failing to devolve revenues that come from extractive activities. Subnational regions around the country have thus gained rights following the devolution of these revenues, and currently spend these revenues through bureaucratic means.

Finally, beyond these collective goods, the mobilization in Tambogrande was the first to invoke and execute a popular referendum in opposition to mining. This strategy, which was neither legally sanctioned nor authorized by the national government, has been replicated in other protests against resource extraction and has helped to consolidate local opposition to mining. Two recent examples include the mobilizations against the Tía María project of the Southern Corporation in the southern region of Arequipa, and the Minera Majaz project of Montrerrico Metals (UK) in the northern region of Piura. The 2009 referendum against the Tía María project contained two questions: whether or not people supported the Tía María project; and whether or not people supported the use of subsoil water for mining. In both instances, residents of the Valle de Tambo overwhelmingly rejected the Tía María project (over 95 percent of eligible residents voted “no”). The Asociación Civil Transparencia, a Lima-based NGO, supervised the referendum. The 2007 popular referendum against the Minera Majaz project generated a high level of voter turnout in the three districts (Ayavaca, Carmen de la Frontera, and Pacaipampa) where the vote occurred. Just over 94 percent of voters rejected the mine, and the referendum attracted several national and international observers—a first in popular referendums of this type. In this way, Tambogrande influenced the repertoire of contention nationally as referendums became a mobilizational tool to stall or prevent mining projects.

**CONCLUSION**

Drawing on data from fieldwork and interviews, I identify the types of mobilizations that are more likely to lead to organized and sustained challenges against resource extraction. Campaigns against extraction tend to be more successful when the perceived threats associated with mining, typical of rights-based mobilizations, become the center of resistance struggles. These localized mobilizations not only lead to immediate positive outcomes against local mining activities, but they also have a wide range of political consequences. Consistent with the literature on the political consequences of movements (Amenta et al. 2010), these outcomes can be characterized as collective goods or group-wise advantages. The extension of consultation rights, the formation of new environmental political parties by movements, and the legislative changes in state allocation of resource revenues are some examples of these collected goods.

As this article has shown, not all the mobilizations against resource extraction are created equal. The claims surrounding service-oriented protests are specific and negotiable. These mobilizations typically result in a pattern of nonstop protest whereby short-lived protests lead to small concessions, which later encourage other short-lived protests and other concessions, and so on. In these cases, protests become a bargaining tool to achieve some political objectives or policy demands, but these concessions remain highly localized and do not represent collective goods at the structural or intermediate levels. In contrast, rights-oriented mobilizations entail broader claims that are less prone to compromise. The analytical distinction between rights- and service-oriented protests is important because, as the social
movement literature reminds us, large-scale mobilizations are difficult to sustain for a long period of time. Protests require extensive organization and mobilization of resources. They require that participants devote time outside of their daily routines to sustain them. Leaders of protest movements might also be bought off by a profitable and politically powerful extractive industry. As the subnational comparison of three cases of mobilization has shown, the motivations (and emotions) of protests over rights are, in fact, quite different from those of protests over services. Protests over rights entail threats, and these threats arguably provide, a stronger rationale for collective resistance vis-à-vis the economic opportunity tied to protests over services. This stronger rationale, which approximates the notion of “moral outrage” articulated by Jasper (1997), facilitates the types of organized and sustained challenges that are more likely to stimulate positive responses on behalf of aggrieved groups. The sustained challenges over rights are also more likely to trickle up collective goods for larger groups. All things considered, it is not an easy undertaking for the less powerful to mount a successful opposition campaign against a lucrative, extractive industry and the governments that sponsor new extractivism, even when emotions are running high.

Finally, a word or two on the effects of protests on democracy may be warranted. Some observers have argued that the mobilizations over resource extraction strengthened democracy in Peru by pushing for social inclusion (Bagua’s C169), popular consultation mechanisms (Tambogrande’s referendum), and other forms of grassroots participation. These arguments are in congruence with those that view protests as a standard feature of democratic politics, rather than as a threat to the stability of democratic regimes or as a nuisance to the functioning of routinized parliamentary politics. However, the arguments suggesting that protests are a sign of a healthy and vibrant democracy are often left vague, failing to point out exactly how protest improves democracy. Here we could simplify our conceptual understanding of democracies by emphasizing two of its core components: the rules that determine how political power is achieved (e.g., fair and competitive elections) and the rules that determine how political power is used (e.g., checks and balances). Protest movements against resource extraction can and do enhance the quality and functioning of democracy. They do so because protestors now and then challenge the boundaries of how political power is exercised (e.g., checks and balances), even at the cost of human life.

NOTES

1 These figures correspond to the period 2006-09 and were taken from the Peruvian Office of the Ombudsman. The breakdown of victims was 43 percent as a consequence of protests, and 57 percent as a result of political violence. With regard to protests, there were 146 deaths (109 civilians and 37 police officers) and 632 wounded (448 civilians and 184 police officers). With regard to insurgency, there were 191 deaths (119 civilians and 72 police officers).

2 Quoted from a cable communication, May 10, 2005, from the U.S. Embassy in Lima as published by WikiLeaks in El Comercio. For a discussion about mining conflicts, see Scurrah (2008), Bebbington (2007), and De Echave et al. (2009).

3 Substantive gains are changes of policy in response to protest. Throughout this article, the terms protest and mobilization are used interchangeably. In keeping with Goodwin and Jasper’s definition (2003: 3), the term protest refers to “the act of challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural beliefs and practices by some individual or group.” The term protest or mobilization refers to organized and sustained challenges.

4 Giugni (2007) and Giugni and Yamasaki (2009) advance three variants of the joint-effect model, depending on which political alliances (first variant), public opinion (second variant), or both factors are necessary (third variant) for policy influence. In this article, I follow the first variant because of the lack of data on public opinion on anti-extractivist campaigns.

5 The distinction between rights- and service-based claims follows Arce (2014).

6 Almeida (2008) also discusses the importance of the breadth of coalitions for movement outcomes.

7 “World Bank: Peru to post Asian growth rate by expanding 5.5% this year,” Andina: Agencia Peruana de Noticias, October 10, 2013.

8 During the colonial era, Peruvian gold and silver provided the Spanish empire with an extraordinary source of wealth.

9 Other authors refer to “new extractivism” as simply “new mining.”

10 Newmont is the majority shareholder of Yanacocha (51.35 percent), followed by the Peruvian firm Compañía de Minas Buenaventura (43.65 percent), and the International Finance Corporation (IFI), a division of the World Bank (5.00 percent).
and oil rents, suggesting the salience of social forces to understand the politics of decentralization, in particular, fiscal government transfers. The presence of mobilizations is a common denominator explaining the roots of both mineral 1970s and the oil-producing departments of the Amazon region of Peru are the main beneficiaries of these inter-examine the incidents surrounding the protest.

11 The terms “associational power” and “collective power” are taken from Silva (2009).
12 Cevice is a traditional national dish of fish marinated in lime sauce.
13 The case studies highlight the three frameworks from political process theory (e.g., Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2006) as well as their interactivity (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Accordingly, when political conditions are favorable, as in the context of democracy (political opportunities), aggrieved groups can deploy broad frames linking resource extraction and injustices (framing strategies), which, in turn, allows for the building of coalitions across various scales (mobilizing structures). See also Arce (2014).
14 The victims included twenty-three police officers, five indigenous peoples, and five Bagua residents, along with one missing police officer. In response to Bagua, the Peruvian Congress also created an investigative commission to examine the incidents surrounding the protest.
16 The origins of mineral rents mirror the creation of oil rents (canon petrolero). Oil rents were established in the mid-1970s and the oil-producing departments of the Amazon region of Peru are the main beneficiaries of these inter-governmental transfers. The presence of mobilizations is a common denominator explaining the roots of both mineral and oil rents, suggesting the salience of social forces to understand the politics of decentralization, in particular, fiscal policy.
18 When Newmont’s Yanacocha arrived in Cajamarca in the early 1990s, the existing laws required mining companies to first conduct an environmental impact report (estudio de impacto ambiental, EIA) before the start of a project. The Ministry of Energy and Mines would then approve these environmental impact reports. In addition to the conducting an EIA, mining companies are now required to present a “social responsibility” plan that outlines how their operations will affect the development of the area where the mineral resource is extracted. Because this plan requires the approval of the local community, mining companies negotiate these plans with the community ahead of time. The preparation of these “social responsibility” plans has encouraged several forms of grassroots participation, though this topic is beyond the scope of this article.

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